In a ubiquitous environment, it is preferable for authentication and key exchange protocols to be optimized automatically in accordance with the security requirements. In this paper, we propose a security verification method for the authentication and key exchange protocols that is based on Bellare et al.'s model. In particular, we show the verification points of one security property for authentication protocols and five security properties for key exchange protocols. We show that this method is valid by verifying four typical examples of the authentication and key exchange protocols.
INTRODUCTION
In a ubiquitous environment where various terminals, devices, and networks are used, it is preferable for authentication and key exchange protocols to be optimized automatically in accordance with the security requirements. For a long period, such protocols were designed by trial and error since their security was evaluated informally.
Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway introduced the first indistinguishability-based formal model of security for authentication and key exchange protocols (hereinafter, BPR model) [1, 2, 3] , which became the basis of considerable subsequent work in this area.
On the other hand, as one of the ways of verifying the security of the protocols, methods based on formal verification were proposed. These methods are classified into those based on state-machine approaches (e.g., NRL Protocol Analyzer [4] ), those using model checkers (e.g., Murϕ [5] ), those using algebraic systems (e.g., spi calculus [6] ), those based on modal logic (e.g., BAN logic [7] ), and those based on inductive approaches (e.g., CafeOBJ [8] ). However, these methods are less than optimal as it takes a considerable amount of time to verify the security of protocols and/or they cannot always verify the security of protocols automatically.
In this paper, we propose a security verification method for authentication and key exchange protocols, based on the BPR model. In particular, we show verification points in accordance with the security requirements for both protocols. The proposed method has the characteristic that it can verify the security of authentication and key exchange protocols automatically more quickly than methods based on formal verification, since only these verification points are checked for the above protocols. We also give four typical examples of the authentication and key exchange protocols, and verify the security of these protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce the BPR model in Sect. 2. The security verification method is proposed for authentication and key exchange protocols in Sect. 3, and the verification points of the security properties for these protocols are presented in Sect. 4. We show verification examples using the proposed method in Sect. 5. Finally, our conclusions are in Sect. 6.
BPR MODEL
This section introduces the security properties of authentication and key exchange protocols in the BPR model. In the BPR model, Bellare et al. introduced new notions of security: "matching conversation" of the authentication protocol and "semantic security" of the key exchange protocol. They formulated the following security properties from real attacks, which are shown in brackets, for each notion in accordance with the security requirements.
(1) Matching conversation (MC)
In an authentication protocol, an adversary cannot alter messages, send other messages, intercept messages, or deliver messages out of order. Authentication and key exchange protocols are provably secure in the BPR model when the matching conversation and semantic security are entirely achieved with respect to the above security properties, respectively. If the long-lived key is not used in the key exchange protocol, (2-e) is not required. In particular, if the password is not used in the key exchange protocol, (2-e) is not required.
SECURITY VERIFICATION METHOD

Outline
This subsection describes the outline of the security verification method for authentication and key exchange protocols that is based on the BPR model. In the BPR model, the security of protocols is reduced to that of some cryptographic primitives. We focus on these cryptographic primitives and their input and output values. The security reasons and types and states of arguments of the cryptographic primitives are analyzed in accordance with the flows and the data that are related to each attack, and then verification points of each security property are introduced. In the proposed method, we check only these verification points for the authentication and key exchange protocols. Therefore, the proposed method can verify the security of protocols automatically more quickly than the methods based on formal verification.
Process
This subsection describes the process of the security verification method for authentication and key exchange protocols.
We deal with only two-party authentication and key exchange protocols in this paper. The verification server (VS) verifies the security of the authentication and key exchange protocols in the following manner:
(1) The VS enumerates all cryptographic primitives used in the authentication and key exchange protocols. Principal cryptographic primitives are classified as follows:
• Secret key encryption group -Secret key encryption (SKE) -Encryption using password (PWE)
• Public key encryption group -Public key encryption (PKE) -Diffie-Hellman family (DH) -Digital signature scheme (SIG)
• Hash function group -Hash function (HF) -Message authentication code scheme (MAC) ( 2) The VS sets up the following among the cryptographic primitives enumerated in step (1) in the authentication and key exchange protocols:
• Cryptographic primitives required for authenticator generation in the authentication protocols (AGF)
• Cryptographic primitives required for key generation in the key exchange protocols (KGF)
• Cryptographic primitives included in the arguments of AGF or KGF (ACP)
• Cryptographic primitives that appear in flows (OCP)
The VS sets up the security reasons for the above cryptographic primitives. Table 1 shows the security reasons of principal cryptographic primitives, which mean the following:
• Indistinguishability (IND): An adversary cannot distinguish between target two events (without knowing the secret data).
• One-wayness (OW): An adversary cannot compute the input value from the output value (without knowing the secret data). 
• Unforgeability (UF): An adversary cannot forge the signature or MAC of the target message without knowing the secret data. Table 2 shows the relations between types and states of flow data and arguments of cryptographic primitives except for SS-FS. If there are incorrect relations, then the VS judges that the authentication and key exchange protocols are not secure.
(4) The VS selects the security properties required for the authentication and key exchange protocols, as described in Sect. 2.
(5) The VS checks verification points shown in Sect. 4 using the elements of step (3) for the security properties of step (4) in the authentication and key exchange 
protocols. Then, the VS sets up the data that are related to each attack. It sets up the elements of step (3) and the security properties of step (4) in accordance with the order of the protocol flows for these data.
Here, the states of flow data and arguments of cryptographic primitives are renewed, where public states are given priority over secret states.
VERIFICATION POINTS
Authentication Protocol
This subsection shows the verification points of the security property for the authentication protocol.
Security against an active attack (MC-AAS)
The security reason of MC-AAS for the authentication protocol in order that an adversary cannot generate a valid authenticator by launching an impersonation attack is as follows:
(a 1 ) AGF has UF or OW.
The VS sets up all flows due to the impersonation attack. Then, the following are the verification points of the security against an active attack, since the authentication protocol needs to have the security reason (a 1 ) of MC-AAS: (a 11 ) AGF is SIG or MAC, and the arguments of AGF contain TPK-PFT, TPK-PSS, TSK-SFT, or TSK-SSS.
(a 12 ) AGF is SKE, PWE, PKE, DH, or HF, and the arguments of AGF contain TSK-SFT or TSK-SSS.
Key Exchange Protocol
This subsection shows the verification points of the security properties for the key exchange protocol.
Security against an active attack (SS-AAS)
The security reasons of SS-AAS for the key exchange protocol in order that an adversary cannot distinguish between the session key and random key by launching an impersonation attack are as follows:
(a 1 ) KGF has IND or OW.
(a 2 ) ACP of KGF has IND or OW.
The VS sets up all flows due to the impersonation attack. Then, the following are the verification points of the security against an active attack, since the key exchange protocol needs to have the security reasons (a 1 ) or (a 2 ) of SS-AAS:
(a 11 ) KGF is SKE, PWE, PKE, HF, or MAC, and the arguments of KGF contain TSK-SFT and (LLK-SRS or PW-SRS).
(a 21 ) ACP of KGF is SKE, PWE, PKE, HF, or MAC, and the arguments of ACP of KGF contain TSK-SFT and (LLK-SRS or PW-SRS).
(a 22 ) ACP of KGF is DH, and the arguments of ACP of KGF contain TSK-SFT.
Security against a passive attack (SS-PAS)
The security reasons of SS-PAS for the key exchange protocol in order that an adversary cannot distinguish between the session key and random key by launching an eavesdropping attack are as follows: 
Security against an off-line dictionary attack (SS-DAS)
The security reason of SS-DAS for the key exchange protocol in order that an adversary cannot search for a password of a party by launching an off-line dictionary attack is as follows:
(c 1 ) OCP whose arguments contain PW has OW.
The VS sets up all flows due to the off-line dictionary attack. Then, the following are the verification points of the security against an off-line dictionary attack, since the key exchange protocol needs to have the security reason (c 1 ) of SS-DAS:
(c 11 ) OCP whose arguments contain PW-SRS is SKE or MAC.
(c 12 ) OCP whose arguments contain PW-SRS is PWE, PKE, or HF, and the arguments of OCP contain TSK-SFT or TSK-SSS.
Security against a known key attack (SS-KAS)
The security reason of SS-KAS for the key exchange protocol in order that an adversary cannot obtain a target session key by launching a known key attack is as follows:
The VS sets up session keys in all other sessions due to the known key attack. Then, the following is the verification point of the security against a known key attack, since the key exchange protocol needs to have the security reason (d 1 ) of SS-KAS:
(d 11 ) KGF is SKE, PWE, PKE, DH, HF, or MAC, and the arguments of KGF contain TSK-SFT or TSK-SSS.
Forward secrecy (SS-FS)
The security reasons of SS-FS for the key exchange protocol in order that an adversary cannot obtain the past session key by launching a corruption attack are as follows:
(e 1 ) KGF has IND or OW.
(e 2 ) KGF has OW, and ACP of KGF has IND.
The VS sets up long-lived keys due to the corruption attack. Then, the following are the verification points of the forward secrecy, since the key exchange protocol needs to have the security reasons (e 1 ) or (e 2 ) of SS-FS:
(e 11 ) KGF is SKE, PWE, PKE, DH, HF, or MAC, and the arguments of KGF contain TSK-SFT or TSK-SSS.
(e 21 ) KGF is HF, ACP of KGF is DH, and the arguments of ACP of KGF contain TSK-SFT or TSK-SSS.
Remark 1 : We showed the verification points of one security property for authentication protocols and five security properties for key exchange protocols, as described above.
Note that checking the verification points of security properties for authentication and key exchange protocols separately means checking those for an authenticated key exchange protocol.
Remark 2 : The verification points of the proposed method are sufficient conditions, but may not be necessary conditions. Therefore, the protocol that has been judged to be secure by the proposed method is actually secure, and the insecure protocol is not judged to be secure by the proposed method. However, the protocol that has been judged not to be secure by the proposed method may be actually secure.
EXAMPLES
This section shows the verification examples using the proposed method described in Sect. 3 and 4.
We verify the security of the following four authentication, key exchange, and authenticated key exchange protocols, using the security verification method:
• Authentication protocol, MAP1 [1] • Authenticated key exchange protocol, AKEP1 [1] • Key exchange protocol, EKE2 [3] • Authenticated key exchange protocol, MAEKE2 [3] Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the protocol flows of MAP1, AKEP1, EKE2, MAEKE2, respectively. Then, the cryptographic primitives and the types and states of flow data and arguments of cryptographic primitives are set up for each protocol as follows, respectively, where the classifications of cryptographic primitives are shown in brackets:
• MAP1:
and f is a pseudorandom function family. Figure 4 : Protocol MAEKE2 [3] , where E pw (a) denotes encryption of a by a password pw.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a security verification method for authentication and key exchange protocols, based on the BPR model. We showed verification points of one security property for authentication protocols and five security properties for key exchange protocols. We showed that the proposed method is valid by verifying four typical examples of the authentication and key exchange protocols.
